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Abstract
The paper presents a notion of rationalizing choice functions that violate the
“Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives” axiom. A collection of linear orderings is said to
provide a rationalization by multiple rationales for a choice function if the choice from any
choice set can be rationalized by one of the orderings. We characterize a tight upper bound
on the minimal number of orderings that is required to rationalize arbitrary choice functions,
and calculate the minimal number for several specific choice procedures.
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Page 11. Introduction
Imagine that you receive information on the choices made by a decision maker (DM)
from all subsets of some set X. You know nothing about the context of these choices. You
look for an explanation for the DM’s behavior. You would probably look first for a single
rationale explaining the behavior. Specifically, you would seek for a rationalizing ordering —
that is, a linear ordering on X, such that for every choice set A  X, the DM’s choice from A
is the best element in A according to the ordering. You recall that the “Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives” axiom (IIA) — which requires that the chosen element from a set
also be chosen from every subset that contains it — is a necessary and sufficient condition for
the existence of such an explanation.
If you had more information about the context of the DM’s choices — that is, the content
of the alternatives and his possible considerations — you might assess this explanation
further. For example, you would probably be somewhat skeptical towards this explanation if
you discovered that the rationalizing ordering minimizes the DM’s well being. However, in
the absence of information about the context of the DM’s behavior, you are likely to find an
explanation by a rationalizing ordering persuasive.
Real-life choice procedures often violate IIA. When confronted with such a procedure,
we tend not to give up on explanation by a rationalizing ordering so quickly. We search for
ways to argue that the procedure does not “really” violate rationality. We have different ways
of doing this. One way is to argue that the DM’s choices originated not from a single
rationale, but from several ones, each being appropriate for a subset of choice problems.
Formally, let X be a (finite) set of alternatives. Denote its cardinality by N.L e tPX  be
the set of all non-empty subsets of X.Achoice function on X assigns to every A  PX  a
unique element cA  in A (we confine ourselves to choice functions and not
correspondences). Our central new concept is the following: a K-tuple of strict preference
relations £ k ¤k1,..,K on X is a rationalization by multiple rationales (RMR) of the choice
function c if for every A, the element cA  is k -maximal in A for some k .
One possible interpretation of this explanation method is that the choice set conveys
information about its constituent elements and given this information, the DM chooses what
he thinks is the best alternative. In other words, the DM has in mind a partition of PX  and
he applies one ordering to each cell in the partition. A cell is like a state of the world. The
DM’s behavior is rationalized after the state of the world is added to the description of the
alternatives.
Clearly, every choice function has an RMR, since every choice set can be said to have its
own relevant rationale. Among the many RMR’s that can be given to a choice function, we
propose to focus on those, which employ the minimal number of orderings. The
meaningfulness of this explanation method for any particular choice function c can thus be
assessed by rc  — the minimal number of orderings in any RMR of c. When rc   1, the
choice function is rational in the usual economic sense. The larger rc , the less meaningful
is the rationalization by multiple rationales that can be given to c.
Let us now consider three specific choice functions, all of which violate IIA. Given the
context in which they are presented, the RMR method will appear particularly appealing.
Luce and Raiffa (1957)’s Dinner
A customer chooses a main course from a restaurant’s menu. He chooses chicken when
the menu consists of steak and chicken only, yet goes for the steak when the menu consists of
steak, chicken and frog’s legs. More generally, a DM is characterized by an alternative x*
Page 2and two orderings,  and " ; he applies  whenever x*Aa n d" whenever x'  A.
IIA is violated in this example. This violation can be attributed to the “epistemic value of
the menu”, to use Sen (1993)’s terminology: the presence of frog’s legs in the menu conveys
information about the quality of the other items. Rationality is violated if an alternative is
described just by the name of the dish, and restored if quality is added to the description.
RMR requires two orderings: one is applied when frog’s legs are on the menu and another is
applied when they are not. The low value of rc  reflects the intuition that RMR is a sensible
way of rationalizing such a choice function.
The u,v  procedure
An individual aims to be as moral as possible. However, if pursuing this goal leads to
harmful consequences from an egotistic point of view, he abandons morality and adopts the
best selfish alternative. More generally, this procedure is based on three primitives: two
numerical functions, u and v, defined on the set X, and a number v'. When choosing an
element from the set A, the DM maximizes u as long as the optimization of u leads to a
consequence, whose v-value is above v'. Whenever the v-value of the u-maximal element in
A falls below v', the DM switches to the v-maximal element.
Typically, such a choice violates IIA. Consider two sets, A  B.T h eu-maximal element
in A may have a v-value above v' and will therefore be chosen from A. At the same time, the
u-maximal element in B may have a v-value below v'; hence, the choice from B will be the
v-maximal element. This element may belong to A and yet be different from the u-maximal
element in A. RMR typically requires two orderings (induced by u and v).
The u,v  procedure has a “twin” procedure, in which the DM maximizes u as long as
this leads to a consequence, whose u-value is above some number u';o t h e r w i s e ,h e
maximizes v. Like the original u,v  procedure, the verbal description of the “twin”
procedure employs two rationales. However, any choice function induced by the “twin”
procedure can be rationalized by a single ordering, which is lexicographic with respect to the
pairs max£ux ,u'¤,vx  : x is preferred to y if ux   uy  and ux   u',o ri f
ux ,uy  t u' and vx   vy .
“The best from among the popular” procedure
A recruiting officer has an ordering over all possible candidates for an academic job. He
classifies the candidates according to their field. Given a set of candidates, he chooses the
best one from the most popular field in the set. More generally, a DM partitions the
alternatives in X into J categories, £Xj¤j1,..,J (where |Xj|u 2 for every j  1,T,J). He also
has in mind a basic ordering  on X. Given a set of alternatives A, the DM chooses an
alternative, which is the best in one of the categories with the highest cardinality. It is easy to
see that rc   J. An RMR will utilize J orderings, where each j is a modification of ,i n
which the elements comprising Xj are moved to the top.
We now turn to our analytical task in this paper: obtaining general bounds on rc  ,a n d
computing it for a variety of choice procedures.
2. A Bound on rc 
A trivial upper bound on the minimal number of rationales that are needed to provide an
RMR for any choice function is N, the cardinality of X. Any collection x  xX,i nw h i c hx
is an ordering that ranks x first, is an RMR of all choice functions. Whatever the choice a is,
it is explained “retrospectively” by the rationale a . Our first proposition employs a variant
on this construction to establish a tighter upper bound on rc :
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Proof: Let c be a choice function. Let b p cX . For every a p b,l e ta be an ordering,
in which a is the top element and b is the second-best element. Consider a set A  PX .I f
cA   a, then this choice can be rationalized by a .I fcA   b, then A p X and hence,
there exists x  X, such that x  A.S i n c e x  A and b is the second-best element in x ,
this ordering rationalizes cA   b. Q
Our next result shows that “almost all” choice functions need N " 1o r d e r i n g sf o ra n
RMR.
Proposition 2: The proportion of choice functions that can be rationalized by less than
N " 1 orderings tends to 0, as N tends to infinity.
The proof will make use of the following simple lemma:
Lemma 0: If rc   K, then there exists an RMR of c with K orderings, all of whose top
elements are distinct.
Proof: Let {k }k1,..,K be an RMR of c with K t N. Suppose that i and j have the
same top element, a. Modify i by moving a to the bottom. The new set of orderings is an
RMR, since for every A  PX :( 1 )I fcA   a was rationalized by i ,i tc o u l da l s ob e
rationalized by j ;( 2 )I fcA  p a was rationalized by i , then a  A and therefore, cA  is
still rationalized by the modified i . Continue modifying i in this way until its top element
appears on the top of no other ordering. This procedure is iterated for any other pair of
orderings having the same top element, until the K orderings have distinct top elements. Q
Proof of Proposition 2: We will calculate an upper bound on the proportion of choice
functions c, with rc  t N " 2. We will then show that this upper bound tends to 0 as N tends
to infinity.
Let Z be a set of triples a,b,T ,w h e r ea and b are two distinct elements in X and T is a
subset of X\£a,b¤, which consists of no more than N " 2 /2 elements. By Lemma 0, c has an
RMR whose rc  orderings have distinct top elements. Thus, to every c with rc  t N " 2, we
can attach a triple a,b,T   Z, such that there exists an RMR of c,f o rw h i c h( 1 )a and b are
not top elements of any ordering and (2) T is the set of top elements in those RMR orderings,
in which a is ranked above b. What is the proportion of choice functions c with rc  t N"2,
to which a particular triple a,b,T   Z can be attached in this way?
For a,b,T   Z to be attached to a choice function c with rc  t N"2, it must be that for
every R  T : £a,b¤, cR  p a.O t h e r w i s e ,cR   a could not be rationalized by any of the
orderings: for any ordering, whose top element is in T, a is ranked below the ordering’s top
element which belongs to R; and for any ordering, whose top element is not in T, a is ranked
below b which also belongs to R.
For a given R, the proportion of choice functions for which cR  p a is
1 " 1/|R|  t 1 " 1/N . Therefore, the proportion of choice functions for which a is chosen
from no superset of T : £a,b¤ is at most 1 " 1/N 2u,w h e r eu  N " 2 /2, since 2u is a
lower bound on the number of subsets of X\T : £a,b¤  . The cardinality of Z is smaller than
N2  2N. Hence, the proportion of choice functions having an RMR with N " 2 orderings is at
most 1 " 1/N 2u  N2  2N, which tends to 0 as N tends to infinity. Q
Note that 1 " 1/N 2u  N2  2N  1f o rN  19. Thus, the above proof implies that for
N  19, there is a choice function c, for which rc   N " 1. It is quite hard to construct
such a choice function for an arbitrary N. In an earlier version of this paper, we used tools
from projective geometry to construct such a choice function for N  p2  p  1, where p is a
prime number. (Details will be provided upon request).
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In contrast to the examples presented in the introduction, we will now analyze two choice
procedures, whose description does not explicitly involve multiple rationales. We will see
that providing an RMR for these procedures requires a “large number” of orderings. In
particular, rc  is not independent of N. The detailed calculations illustrate the type of
analytical arguments involved in the application of the RMR method.
3.1. The “second-best” procedure
A DM has in mind an ordering  on the set X. For every A  X, he chooses the
second-best element in A, according to . We will show that there is no way to rationalize the
second-best procedure with a “small” (and independent of N) number of rationales.
Proposition 3:L e tc be a choice function that follows the second best procedure. Then,
rc   log2N, rounded off to the higher integer.
Proof: For the constructive part of the proposition, it is sufficient to deal with the case of
N being a power of 2, since any RMR of a choice function over X will also rationalize the
choice function restricted to a subset of X. The construction will be inductive. For N  2, the
single ordering that places cX  on top suffices.
Let N  2n1 and let the set Y consist of the 2n -top elements in X . Denote Z  X\Y.
By the inductive assumption there is a profile of n orderings on Y, k  k1,T,n, which is an
RMR for c defined on Y. Likewise, there is a profile of n orderings on Z, k
U  k1,T,n,w h i c h
is an RMR for c defined on Z. We will now construct n  1o r d e r i n g s£Pk¤k1,T,n1 ,w h i c h
will provide an RMR for c defined on X. In each of the orderings Pk, k  1,..,n,t h e
elements of Y appear on top, ranked by k , followed by the elements of Z,r a n k e db yk
U .I n
the ordering Pn1, the elements of Z appear on top, ranked by , followed by the elements of
Y,r a n k e db y as well.
Let us check that this n  1 -tuple of orderings indeed provides an RMR of c, defined on
X. Consider a choice set A.I f| A 9 Y| u 2, then cA   cA 9 Y , by the definition of c.
Therefore, cA  can be rationalized by Pk,w h e r ek is the ordering that rationalizes cA 9 Y 
in the RMR for c over Y.I fA 9 Y  C, then cA  can be rationalized by Pk,w h e r ek
U is the
ordering that rationalizes cA 9 Y  in the RMR for c over Z.I f| A 9 Y|  1, then cA  is
rationalized by Pn1.
It remains to be shown that if j  j1,T.,n is an RMR of c, then N t 2n.L e tz be the
-minimal element in X. For each j,d e f i n eAj   £x  X; x j z¤. We will show that
without loss of generality, we can assume that if both x and y belong to Aj  and x  y, then
x j y. Assume the contrary, i.e., y j x.I f cS   x is rationalized by j , then y  S.B y
the definition of c, S includes exactly one element that is -better than x and therefore,
cS : £y¤   x. Thus, there must exist some ordering h , h p j, which rationalizes
cS : £y¤   x –t h a t i s , x h w for every w  S : £y¤, w p x. But this means that
cS   x can be rationalized by h . Therefore, we can transform j by moving x down,
such that z j x, and still have a profile of orderings which rationalizes c.
No element x p z can be ranked above z in all n orderings; otherwise, c£x,z¤  z is not
rationalized by any of the orderings. In addition, no two elements x,y satisfying x  y  z are
ranked above z in the same set of orderings; otherwise, c£x,y,N¤  y is not rationalized by
any of the n orderings, since for every j either x j y or z j y. Thus, for every element
x p z, there is a unique proper subset of orderings, in which x is ranked above z. The number
of proper subsets of the n orderings is 2n " 1. Therefore, N " 1 t 2n " 1. Q
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Sen (1993), a college tea party participant consistently chooses the second-largest slice of
cake. McFadden (1999) mentions people’s tendency to choose the second-cheapest wine on
the wine list in restaurants. In these examples, choice behavior violates IIA when
alternatives are described by their size or price alone. However, in both cases, the context
suggests that the DM’s have additional considerations. In Sen’s example, the DM may be
concerned with his perceived greediness, while in McFadden’s example, he may believe that
the cheapest wine on the wine list is not drinkable. Thus, in each case, rationality of choice
behavior is restored if the description of alternatives is extended, so as to include perceived
greediness or wine quality.
It should be stressed that in both anecdotes, the appeal of the rationalizations derives
from the additional information concerning the DM’s considerations, provided by the choice
problem’s description. In contrast, our rationalization method is “context-free” — it does not
make use of any information other than choice behavior. Therefore, it is not surprising that
the minimal RMR constructed in the proof of Proposition 3 bears no resemblance to the
ad-hoc rationalizations we provided for the two anecdotes.
3.2 The “median” procedure
A voter orders all potential political candidates along a left-right axis. Given a set of
candidates, he chooses the “median” candidate. Formally, let X  £1,T,N¤. For every set
A  X consisting of an odd number of elements, let medA  be the median element in A, with
respect to the natural ordering. (We do not define the choice function for sets consisting of an
even number of elements.) We will show that rmed  is quite close to N " 1.
Proposition 4: For all N, N " 6 N  rmed  t N " N  1
Proof: Let us show first that rmed  t N " N  1. Denote t  N " 1. Let
k  kt1,T,N be a profile of orderings satisfying: (1) k is the top element of k ; (2) every
j  £1,T,t¤ is the second-best element in N " t /t of the orderings. If medA   £1,T,t¤,
then the set A does not contain more than t " 1 elements from among £t  1,T,N¤.S i n c e
N " t /t  t " 1, the choice medA  is rationalized by one of the N " t /t orderings, for
which medA  is the second-best element.
For the proof that N " 6 N  rmed , we need an auxiliary claim:
Claim:I f rmed   K, then there exists an RMR of med consisting of K orderings with
distinct top elements, which are adjacent (with respect to the natural ordering).
Denote rmed   K. By the claim, there is an element j a n da nR M Ro fmed with K
orderings, whose top elements are the members of T  £j,j  1,T,j  K " 1¤.L e t
jU  N " j  K " 1  and assume that jU t j, without loss of generality. Assume, contrary to
the proposition, that j  3 N.L e tZ  £j " N,...,j " 1¤ . Since the number of orderings is
less than N, there exists z  Z that is ranked above all other members of Z in no more than
N orderings. Denote the set of top elements in those orderings by TU. Construct a choice
set Y  Z : TU : A,w h e r eA is a subset of £1,T,j " N " 1¤, such that medY   z.F o r
this to work, we need |A| to satisfy z " j " N   |A|  |T
U|  j " 1 " z. Rearranging, we
obtain |A|  |T
U|  2j " 1 " 2z " N. There are enough elements to assign to A because
j " z t N and z " |T
U| u 2 N and thus |T
U|  2j " 1 " 2z " N t j " N " 1.
Now, medY   z is not rationalized by any of the K orderings: it cannot be rationalized
by any of the orderings, whose top elements belong to TU because these orderings always rank
z below some x  TU; and it cannot be rationalized by any of the other orderings because
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Proof of claim:L e tT be the set of top elements in the K orderings. By Lemma 0, we can
assume that |T|  K.L e ta be the ordering, whose top element is a. The proof is by
contradiction. Without loss of generality, there exists an element x  N/2, such that x  1  T
and x  T. Construct a profile of K orderings £ a
U ¤ as follows. For every a p x  1, obtain
a
U from a by exchanging the positions of x and x  1, in case x a x  1. Obtain the
ordering x1
U from x1 by moving x to the top. We need to verify that we can rationalize
the choice from every set A with the new profile of orderings.
Clearly, whenever x,x  1  A, medA  is rationalized by a
U iff it is rationalized by a .
If x  1  A and x  A then either medA   x  1, in which case x
U rationalizes medA ,o r
medA  p x  1, and then medA  is rationalized by some a
U ,w h e r ea rationalizes
medA " £x  1¤ : £x¤ .
We are left with the case of x  A.I f medA   x, then x1
U rationalizes the choice. If
medA  p x, then there are two possibilities:
(1) x  1  A Let B  A " £x¤ : £x  1¤. Then, medB   medA  p x  1. medB  is not
rationalized by x1 . Therefore, there exists a p x  1, such that a rationalizes medB .
That is medB  a y for every y  A\£x,medB ¤ and medB  a x  1. By construction,
medA   medB  is the a
U -optimal element in A.
(2) x  1  A If medA  is rationalized by some a p x1 , then medA  a y for any
other y  A. By construction, the relative ranking between medA  p x and any other
y p x  1 is not changed in a
U .S i n c e medA  a x,w ea l s oh a v emedA  a
U x  1. Now,
assume that medA  is rationalized by x1 . Then, medA   x  1. Since x  N/2, at least
two elements smaller than x are missing from A.L e tB be the union of A and those two
elements. Therefore, medB   x, which is rationalized by some a , a p x  1. By
construction, a
U a . Therefore, a
U rationalizes medA . Q
The high value of rmed  indicates that RMR is not a meaningful explanation of the
median procedure, and even less so than in the case of the second-best procedure. Under
RMR, the DM always applies a single rationale to any particular choice problem, although
different rationales may fit different choice problems. The median procedure may be better
explained by the existence of two fixed, diametrically opposed rationales, such that the DM
tries to balance between them in the face of any choice problem.
4. Final Comments
The economist’s standard way of explaining choice behavior is by seeking an ordering,
whose maximization is consistent with the behavior. We proposed a variant of this approach:
seeking a “small” number of orderings, such that the choice in every “case” (a choice set) is
consistent with maximization with respect to one of those orderings. We extend the standard
approach to choice functions that violate IIA by following the premise that the appeal of the
explanation depends on the number of orderings involved.
We fully acknowledge the crudeness of this approach. The appeal of the RMR proposed
for “Luce and Raiffa’s dinner” does not emanate only from its small number of orderings
(two), but also from the simplicity of describing in which cases each of them is applied.
There is an element x'  X, such that all choices from sets that include x' are governed by
one rationale and all other choices are dictated by another rationale. More research is needed
to define and investigate more “structured” forms of rationalization.
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(1993) that if “motives, values or conventions” are missing from our description of the
alternatives, then we’d better correct our model, whether or not IIA is violated. For example,
if we knew that when the DM picks a slice of cake, he also cares about his perceived
greediness, we would find it fitting to explain his choice behavior by adjusting the
consequence space, so as to accommodate this additional motive and we would find an
RMR-based explanation inappropriate, even if we discovered that rc  is low. Thus,
although we accept that “there is no way of determining whether a choice function is
consistent or not without referring to something external to choice behavior” (Sen (1993)),
we believe that rationalization by a minimal number of rationales is an appropriate extension
of the economist’s standard approach – especially in the absence of information about
“something external”.
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